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Following a new announcement of cuts to the UK armed forces, many are asking whether we are seeing
Britain’s defence capabilities in decline. Andrew Dorman warns against simply focusing on focus
on numbers or money. There is no direct relationship between amount spent or size of the armed
forces and the security of the nation or between numbers of personnel and capability. Also, focusing
on the armed forces is also problematic given that in many ways the battlefields of today and
tomorrow are different.
Last week was full of bad news for defence. A report by the House of Commons Defence Committee
was highly critical of the coalition’s government’s preparation for the next Strategic Defence and Security Review. In
part the report continued the debate on strategy making within the Ministry of Defence first started in International
Affairs but in this case following the Lindley-French line of divorcing the link between ends and the means to achieve
those ends. The Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond, also announced the fourth tranche of redundancies that have
befallen the UK’s armed forces since the coalition government came to power in 2010. As a result, the regular army
will be reduced from 102,000 in 2010 to 82,000. The other two services have suffered comparable cutbacks.
A month earlier, at the annual Chief of Defence Staff lecture at the
Royal United Services Institute, General Sir Nick Houghton had
indicated that any further cuts would have a disproportionate effect
on the United Kingdom’s ability to use military power. The future
construct of the UK’s armed forces – Future Force 2020 – is
predicated on defence spending that will increase by 1-2 % per year
in real terms from 2015 and the Ministry of Defence managing to
keep its costs under control. Neither looks likely, the current coalition
government have pledged to increase the amount spent on
equipment by some 1% but have made no commitment about the
overall defence budget.
Moreover, the ongoing reforms have run into difficulties. The planned
transfer of the Defence Equipment and Support organisation to
private operation failed as the number of bidders declined to one
whilst there is little evidence that the Ministry of Defence has
managed to overcome the increasing top-heaviness of its military first
identified in 2009 as a parliamentary answer confirmed (cols.604-
8W). Moreover, in his Autumn statement the Chancellor, George
Osborne, confirmed that Britain’s structural deficit has not been
resolved and that there would need to be additional cuts to public spending. The general assumption within
Whitehall is that defence got off lightly in 2010 and that it should be expected to undergo significant reductions in the
future. Thus, the planned regular army of 82,000 looks optimistic at best.
Yet, within NATO, the United Kingdom is proportionately one of the highest spenders barely managing to meet the
NATO target of 2% of GDP on defence. So are we seeing Britain’s defence capabilities in decline? Three points
need to be borne in mind before such an assumption is made. First, there is no direct relationship between amount
spent or size of the armed forces and the security of the nation. Defence spending in large part is directly linked to
the threats and fears that a nation and its people feel confronted by. In many respects the United Kingdom has
never been safer, the government’s own National Security Strategy indicates that many of the challenges before the
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United Kingdom are no defence related, there is no Soviet Union and thus in a period of relative peace the funding
allocated to defence can logically fall. It is worth noting that, for the first time since the 19th century, the British Army
is facing the prospect of being stationed almost entirely in the United Kingdom without a defined threat to prepare
for. The British Army does not know how to deal with peacetime.
Second, there is no direct link between numbers of personnel and
capability. There are two other factors at play. First there is the
qualitative element in calculating military capability. For example,
both the United Kingdom and Portugal main a marine brigade but
few suggest that they are comparable. The Royal Marines 3
Commando Brigade is an elite fighting unit with few peers. Thus,
whilst the number of strike aircraft in the Royal Air Force’s
inventory today is much smaller than at the time of the First Gulf
War in 1991 or the Kosovo War in 1999 their capability is far
greater. Today’s Tornados can strike with precision in all weathers
unlike the same aircraft a decade ago thanks to the weapons with
which they are now equipped. Similarly, a British Army infantry
battalion today can generate far greater firepower than its World
War 2 counterpart. Secondly, there is the question of intent, how
prepared is the government to use its armed forces. With a toxic
legacy of Afghanistan and Iraq there must be serious questions
about whether the government will be prepared to use force unless
in response to a 9/11 happening in the United Kingdom.
Third, focusing on the armed forces is also problematic. In
answering questions on the latest personnel reductions Philip
Hammond rightly pointed out that in many ways the battlefields of
today and tomorrow are different. At the start of this millennium few
were putting the case for cyber defence yet for many nations cyber
warfare is the principle focus and this requires different types of
forces.
This leaves one to conclude that a simple focus on numbers or
money is merely to focus on an input measure that may bear little relationship to the output that can be generated.
Thus, whilst the capabilities of Britain’s armed forces may not be diminishing as starkly as the numbers might
suggest, there is a serious question mark hanging over the future use of military force by this and future British
governments.
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